Major John N. Rickard, CD, PhD
The combat effectiveness of the German Army in the Second World War is frequently attributed to a narrow, post-war interpretation of Auftragstaktik (“mission-type orders”), a German concept that stressed considerable subordinate freedom to achieve the superior’s intent. Decentralized decision-making supported German operations dispersed over the vast frontages of the war, but commanders exercised a greater degree of control over operations and subordinates than the currently accepted interpretation of Auftragstaktik would suggest. Commanders controlled operations through practicing Führen von vorn (Forward Command), a command philosophy that was both a derivative of Auftragstaktik and insurance against its weaknesses. Forward Command was absolutely essential to achieve the tempo demanded by the German doctrine of manoeuvre and annihilation (Vernichtungsschlacht), and compensated for human weakness in a way that pure Auftragstaktik could not. Post-war interpretations of Auftragstaktik require revision because they do not accurately capture the degree to which Forward Command enabled tactical and operational success.
The German Army entered the Second World War with the 1933 manual Heeresdienstvorschrift (Army Regulation) 300, Truppenführung (Unit Command). Neither the term Auftragstaktik nor Führen von vorn appeared in the manual. Indeed, Auftragstaktik was not a basic word in the lexicon of either the Prussian Army or the Wehrmacht. The Germans generally used the phrase Selbständigkeit der Unterführer (independence of the subordinate commander). Nevertheless, the spirit of both Auftragstaktik and Forward Command are clearly evident in the 1933 manual. Truppenführung declared that the division commander’s place was “with his troops” and he should be “well forward.” In an advance to contact his place was with the advance guard of the column which he had estimated would play the key role because it was there that “he can most quickly exert his influence.” It was critical that he position himself “at the decisive point, and as early as possible.” The objective, derived from the mission, must be pursued with “the full will of the commander” because victory “often is won by the stronger will.”
Truppenführung clearly stated that the commander “must allow his subordinates freedom of action,” and this really the source of our modern understanding of Auftragstaktik. The caveat, however, was only “so long as it does not adversely affect his overall intent.” The commander “may not … surrender to his subordinates decisions for which he alone is responsible.” Subordinates could deviate from the intent, but it was a serious matter, as evidenced by the fact that they were required to immediately notify their higher commander. The superior commander was therefore the conductor of the orchestra. He assigned missions after considering the relationship between the “necessity for unity of action and the independent action of units.” Independent action was expected, of course, but it was the “close coordination” of independent actions that “will influence decisively the success of the advance.” General Waldemar Erfurth stated in his 1938 work Die Überraschung im Kriege, modern dispersion tactics gave subordinate leaders “a rather large measure of independence.” Yet only the superior commander could ensure close coordination.
